







BLUSHING OUR WAY PAST HISTORY 
Seth Barrett Tillman* 
Legal academics and the public are fascinated by both 
constitutional text and the processes by which it is 
interpreted.  The precise role for legal academics in the 
interpretation of such charters is controverted.  Doctrine and 
case law as established by the courts remain the core of 
academic legal discourse.  Case law is, after all, the object 
about which doctrine is based, built, and extended.  But the 
interpretation of constitutional text through case law comes 
with costs—it seems to lack democratic legitimacy, and where 
unconnected to text and history, it has a tendency to fence out 
(even the well-educated) public.  On the other hand, when 
legal academics shift to text and history, their work gains 
populist credentials, but, at that point, the legal academic 
risks his privileged position.  For the legal academic has no 
monopoly, or even highly developed expertise, with regard to 
textual exegesis or the best use of historical materials.  In 
light of those attendant risks, I want to praise Professor 
Geoffrey R. Stone for taking on the role of exegete and 
historian in his recent publication appearing in the UCLA 
Law Review.1  But that said, I find some of his specific textual 
and historical claims troubling.  I respond to his textual and 
historical claims in detail below.  This paper, however, has no 
grand normative claim of its own; it is merely an effort on my 
part to correct the record, and thereby to further the object 
pursued first by Professor Stone: ―to know the truth about the 
Framers, about what they believed, and about what they 
 
 *  Seth Barrett Tillman is a career federal law clerk.  The views expressed are 
solely my own.  While this version has been shortened, an unabridged version will 
appear at: Seth Barrett Tillman, Blushing Our Way Past Historical Fact And 
Fiction: A Response to Professor Geoffrey R. Stone’s Melville B. Nimmer Memorial 
Lecture and Essay, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 391 (forthcoming 2009) (unabridged 
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 1 Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers: A Christian Nation?, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 1 (2008). 
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aspired to when they created this nation.‖2 
 
I     AN ANALYSIS OF PROFESSOR STONE’S TEXTUAL CLAIMS 
 
In his The World of the Framers: A Christian Nation?, 
Professor Stone wrote: 
Indeed, it is quite striking, and certainly no accident, that 
unlike the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, the U.S. 
Constitution made no reference whatsoever to God and 
cited as its primary source of authority not ―the word of 
God,‖ but ―We the People.‖  The stated purpose of the 
Constitution was not to create a ―Government established 
to God,‖ not to establish a ―Christian nation,‖ but rather to 
create a secular state.  The only reference to religion in the 
original Constitution prohibited the use of any religious test 
for holding office, and the First Amendment made clear 
that there ―would be no Church of the United States.‖3 
Are these claims sound?  Is it ―striking‖ that the 
Constitution of 1787 stylistically veered from the 
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut—an instrument 150 
years older than the Constitution at the time of ratification?  
Is it true that the text makes ―no reference whatsoever to 
God‖?  Is it true that the ―only reference to religion‖ in the 
original unamended text was the Religious Test Clause?  To 
me at least, these seem to be an unusually strong set of 
(textual) claims for a law review article: claims lacking 
recognition of ambiguity and contrary points of view. 
The Attestation Clause.  Every copy of the Constitution I 
have seen since childhood ends with: 
Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the 
States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the 
Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty 
seven and of the Independence of the United States of 
America the Twelfth . . . .4 
Is not that a direct textual reference to God, even if not 
your God or mine, or even if you do not believe in any God at 
all?  I am certainly not suggesting that the presence of this 
clause makes ours a Christian nation, nor am I suggesting 
that even any one Framer or Ratifier thought that this clause 
had a justiciable meaning that could control a live case or 
 
 2 Id. at 26. 
 3 Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
 4 U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 2 (Attestation Clause).  But see id. art. V (referring, 
without more, to ―the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight‖). 
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controversy.  But in making his argument that the United 
States Constitution created a ―secular‖ nation, that the text 
makes ―no reference whatsoever to God,‖ Professor Stone has 
simply ignored the actual text of the Constitution he seeks to 
explain. 
The Oaths and Affirmations Clause.  Nor is this the only 
such clause in the Constitution that makes some (albeit 
indirect) reference to God.  The Article VI Oaths or 
Affirmations Clause mandated that all future federal and 
state legislators and certain officers take an oath or 
affirmation to support the Constitution.5  What is the 
difference between an oath and affirmation?  The consensus 
view—and as far as I know the universal view—is that the 
former is taken in God’s name, but the latter is not.6  The 
purpose of the clause—according to the standard narrative—
was to permit Quakers and others having ―a religious or other 
conscientious objection to oath-taking‖ to also hold public 
office.  The purpose is one of ―inclusiveness and tolerance,‖7 
but it is also a textual reference to God in our public charter—
albeit an indirect one. 
The Sundays Excepted Clause.  Another clause that might 
interest us is the Sundays Excepted Clause, which provides: 
―If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten 
Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to 
him, the Same shall be a Law . . . .‖8  Does this clause 
establish any specific or named religion?  No.  Does it 
establish a particular church?  No.  But if the intent of the 
Founders or Ratifiers had been ―to create‖ no more and no less 
than ―a secular state,‖9 then ought not Professor Stone tell us 
why this clause was included in the Constitution, and thereby 
entrenched against mundane democratic action?  One wonders 
what purpose or purposes Professor Stone believes this clause 
was meant to serve. 
The Religious Test Clause.  Additionally, I note that 
Professor Stone wrote that the Religious Test Clause prohibits 
―the use of any religious test for holding office.‖  I do not mean 
to quibble, but his position is not quite right—or, at the very 
least, his position is not the only possible understanding of the 
 
 5 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (―Oath or Affirmation‖); see also id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 
(mandating that Senators adjudicate impeachments ―on Oath or Affirmation‖); cf. id. 
art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (mandating that the President ―swear (or affirm)‖ to his ―Oath or 
Affirmation‖). 
 6 See, e.g., 67 C.J.S. Oaths and Affirmations §§ 1–3 (2008). 
 7 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 301 (2006). 
 8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 9 Stone, supra note 1, at 5. 
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clause.  Its meaning may have been more limited than 
Professor Stone suggests. 
The Religious Test Clause prohibits the use of any 
religious test as a ―Qualification to any Office or public Trust 
under the United States.‖10  In other words, textually, the 
clause precludes any religious test used to qualify a person for 
office—i.e., a test implemented at the time a person is elected 
or appointed to office, or at the start of the term for which the 
officer was elected or appointed, or at the time the officer 
accepts office or takes office by removing his outgoing 
predecessor.  ―The question with reference to the point of time 
at which [a] required qualification for office [must] exist is a 
complex judicial question.‖11  If, as I suggest, qualifications 
only apply at some discrete moment or point of time, then, 
contra Professor Stone, once qualified, once in office, once a 
person begins to hold office and thereafter, the Religious Test 
Clause has no further application (as a textual matter).  Now, 
post-1791, such religious tests going to office-holders and 
office-holding, are precluded under the aegis of the more 
general First Amendment.  But in 1789, in the (non-wholly 
Christian, non-wholly secular) world of the Framers and 
Ratifiers, under the Constitution unamended by the Bill of 
Rights, it very well may have been a different story. 
Does my textual critique vanquish Stone’s central point—
that the American Constitution’s ―stated purpose [was] to 
create a secular state‖?  No, not entirely—and it is not really 
my purpose to do so.  In fact, it is certainly true that the 
Founders’ design lacked a national establishment.  
Nevertheless, our national government continued to coexist 
(comfortably) for many years with its component states, many 
of which had established churches in 1787 and continued to 
have them for many decades to come.  Indeed, many scholars 
have argued that the very purpose of the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment was to prevent 
disestablishment of state churches by the newly constituted 
federal authorities.12  So if what we mean by a Christian state 
is a government comparable to then-contemporaneous 
England and Scotland, which each had their own established 
churches, then the government of the early Republic was not a 
Christian state.  But if what we mean by a secular state is a 
government comparable to that created by the French 
 
 10 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (prohibiting religious tests as a requirement to 
―Qual[ify] to any Office or public Trust under the United States‖). 
 11 67 C.J.S. Officers and Public Employees § 24 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 12 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 32 (1998). 
50 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO  2009 
Revolution—a government that dated its instruments 
exclusively in term of the revolutionary calendar and which 
made no accommodations to its religious elements, then our 
government did not take that shape either. 
To me at least it seems less than fully forthcoming to 
describe the government of the early Republic as Christian or 
secular.  It was just more complex than that.  History usually 
works that way.  Indeed, my own experience is that text, 
structure, and history rarely all line up the same way, and if 
they do, it usually means that we have simply missed 
something of consequence or (even worse) have drunk the 
hemlock of our own ideas so deeply that we fail to see the 
value in other people13 and in other peoples’ points of view. 
Which takes me to my second point. 
Nowhere in Professor Stone’s article is there any 
discussion of the arguments or any acknowledgment, by name, 
of the persons he is opposing.  He asserts that someone 
somewhere has made the argument that America is a 
―Christian nation.‖  He cites, but does not quote, a single 
article in The New York Times14 (ostensibly, not by one of his 
intellectual opponents, but merely by a reporter reporting on 
events) and two books,15 the more recent of which dates from 
1987—over twenty years ago.  In no place does he discuss 
precisely who is making the arguments he has opposed, when 
and in what forums they have made those arguments, and 
what arguments or evidence (if any) they have marshaled on 
behalf of their position.  Nor does Stone discuss how their 
positions might differ among one another—including different 
conceptions of what it might mean to describe the United 
States as a secular or Christian nation.  This aspect of 
Professor Stone’s presentation—one lacking acknowledgment 
(much less substantial development) of opposing viewpoints—
is troubling. 
Let me put it another way: when one of Professor Stone’s 
purported intellectual opponents asserts that the United 
States was founded as a ―Christian nation,‖ what does that 
 
 13 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 1, at 6 (―Indeed, as we shall see, many of the 
leaders of the Revolutionary generation were not Christians in any traditional sense.  
They were [by contrast?] broad-minded intellectuals . . . .‖). 
 14 See id. at 2 n.7 (citing Neela Banerjee, Clashing Over Church Ritual and Flag 
Protocol at the Naval Academy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2008, at A9). 
 15 See id. at 3 n.13 (citing JERRY FALWELL, LISTEN AMERICA! 25 (1980) and TIM 
LAHAYE, FAITH OF OUR FOUNDING FATHERS 29 (1987)).  LaHaye’s publication is 
over twenty years old.  One wonders if LaHaye or Professor Stone remains wed to 
everything they wrote more than twenty years ago.  Of course, we cannot ask this of 
Falwell; he is dead. 
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person mean?  Is that a claim about what an American circa 
1787 expected about post-1787 demographic development?  Is 
it a claim about the intellectual culture circa 1787?  Or, is it 
an interpretive claim about the original understanding of our 
founding legal and political documents (and if so, which 
documents)?  Stone never tells us what his opponents mean, 
only that they are wrong. 
 
II     AN ANALYSIS OF PROFESSOR STONE’S CLAIMS RELATING TO 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LIFE AND 
UNIVERSITY CULTURE 
 
I quote Professor Stone in full. 
The Christian establishment responded with a vengeance 
[to the spread of Deism].  As early as 1759, Ezra Stiles 
warned that ―Deism has got such [a] Head‖ that it is 
necessary to ―conquer and demolish it.‖  Thirty years later, 
Timothy Dwight, the president of Yale, published a biting 
antideist work, The Triumph of Infidelity, and Edward 
Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire was 
literally put to the torch at Harvard because of ―its 
uncomplimentary interpretation of early Christianity.‖  In 
1784, Ethan Allen, the leader of the Green Mountain Boys 
and the hero of the Battle of Ticonderoga, published a book-
length argument for deism.  This work, Reason the Only 
Oracle of Man, was furiously condemned by clergy.  
Timothy Dwight accused Allen of championing ―Satan’s 
cause,‖ Ezra Stiles charged that Allen was ―profane and 
impious,‖ and the Reverend Nathan Perkins called him 
―one of the wickedest men that ever walked this guilty 
globe.‖16 
Stone’s consistent use of terms like ―with a vengeance,‖ 
―warn[],‖ ―biting,‖ ―accused,‖ and ―charged‖ is puzzling.  Is it 
really true the clergy not only ―condemned‖ Allen’s Reason the 
Only Oracle of Man, but that they did so ―furiously‖?  How 
does one fairly distinguish a furious condemnation from a 
plain condemnation from a mere emphatic disagreement or an 
honest debate over strongly held beliefs and principles?  The 
choice of such terms is, in most (albeit, not in all) cases, 
indicative of a lack balance, of a lack of perspective.  Much of 
what Stone describes above was nothing more than writings 
and speeches in private letters, sermons, and books.  In law 
review articles, traditionally, such speech is usually 
 
 16 Id. at 21 (footnotes omitted). 
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characterized in less judgmental and more neutral terms, i.e., 
as core First Amendment protected activity (although there 
was, of course, no First Amendment at this time). 
Indeed, if such speech is fairly characterized as 
―respond[ing] with a vengeance,‖ merely because it opposes 
other speech and comes next-in-time, then this Article and 
every other academic disagreement will fall under the orbit of 
that expression.  At that point the phrase itself ceases to be 
meaningful.  Admittedly, not all of the statements quoted by 
Stone were vanilla, even-handed, and unthreatening: Stile’s 
―conquer and demolish‖ statement does seem a touch strong.  
But Stiles looks much better in fuller context. 
It is true with this Liberty [of accepting deistical books into 
religiously-affiliated university libraries] Error may be 
introduced; but turn the Tables [and see that] the 
propagation of Truth may be extinguished [if you do 
otherwise].  Deism has got such [a] Head in this Age of 
Licentious Liberty, that it would be in vain to try to stop it 
by hiding the Deistical Writings: and the only Way left to 
conquer & demolish it, is to come forth into the open Field 
& Dispute this matter on even Footing—the Evidences of 
Revelation in my opinion are nearly as demonstrative as 
Newton’s Principia, & these are the Weapons to be used. . . .  
Truth & this alone being our Aim in fact, open, frank & 
generous we shall avoid the very appearance of Evil.17 
How is this an example of the ―establishment respond[ing] 
with a vengeance‖ to the spread of Deism?  If anything Stiles 
overflows with a very boring almost trite excess of Brandeisian 
toleration, although he clearly is attached to his own parochial 
theological views.  To me at least, Stone’s ―conquer and 
demolish‖ snippet misses much more than it explains. 
As to Stone’s specific claim that circa 1789 Gibbon’s 
Decline and Fall was ―literally put to the torch at Harvard,‖ I 
see no evidence that any such event ever happened.  To make 
his case, Stone wholly relies on Professor Kerry Walters’ 1992 
publication: Rational Infidels: The American Deists.18  Walters 
does not actually say ―torched,‖ he says ―burned.‖19  Walters, 
in turn, relies on William Henry Channing’s The Life of 
William Ellery Channing, D.D. and G. Adolf Koch’s 
 
 17 Letter from Ezra Stiles to Rector Thomas Clap (Aug. 6, 1759), in I. 
WOODBRIDGE RILEY, AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY: THE EARLY SCHOOLS 217 (Dodd, Mead 
& Co. 1907) (cited by Stone, supra note 1, at 21 n.155). 
 18 See Stone, supra note 1, at 21 & n.156 (citing KERRY WALTERS, RATIONAL 
INFIDELS: THE AMERICAN DEISTS 8–9 (1992)). 
 19 KERRY WALTERS, RATIONAL INFIDELS: THE AMERICAN DEISTS 9 (1992). 
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Republican Religion.20  But neither work supports Walters’ 
position.  Channing merely records that ―[t]he patrons and 
governors of the college made efforts to counteract the effect of 
the[] [principles of the French Revolution] by exhortation, and 
preaching, and prayer, as well as by the publication and 
distribution of good books and pamphlets.‖21  I see no 
indication of any book-burning.  By contrast, Koch writes that 
in 1791 ―Gibbon’s famous work was publicly banned . . . by the 
President of Harvard College from that institution.‖22  Again, 
no book-burning, no torching, no auto-da-fé. 
Nevertheless book-banning at a university is pretty 
terrible behavior (or, at least, it is when adjudged under 
contemporary standards).  But it seems there was no book 
banning either!  Koch’s only source is John Quincy Adams’ 
Life in a New England Town: 1787, 1788.23  Adams does not 
indicate that Gibbon was banned; rather, Adams indicates 
that in setting the curriculum the President preferred Millot’s 
Elements of History24 to Gibbon’s Decline and Fall.25  To sum 
up, in 1791 Harvard made a mundane curriculum decision; it 
was recorded in a 1903 publication; in 1933 it became a book-
banning; in 1992 it became a book-burning, and in 2008 
Professor Stone tells us Gibbon was ―literally put to the torch‖ 
at Harvard.  Literally. 
The constellation of facts, misunderstandings, 
misstatements, exaggeration, and error hardly seems 
believable.  Still, there is no reason to judge Stone harshly: 
such mistakes do happen.  His mistake, such as it was, was to 
rely on a single source, Walters, who, apparently misquoted 
Koch, who expanded on Adams’ initial statement. 
*** 
Here we come to an awkward and difficult point.  Leave 
aside Professors Stone, and Walters, and Koch—what about 
you, the reasonable and well-informed reader.  When you read 
 
 20 See id. at 9 & nn.8, 9 (citing G. ADOLF KOCH, REPUBLICAN RELIGION: THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE CULT OF REASON 242 (H. Holt & Co. 1933) and 
W.H. CHANNING, LIFE OF WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING, D.D. 30 (Boston, American 
Unitarian Association 1880)). 
 21 W.H. CHANNING, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM ELLERY CHANNING, D.D. 30–31 
(Boston, American Unitarian Association 1880). 
 22 G. ADOLF KOCH, REPUBLICAN RELIGION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE 
CULT OF REASON 290 n.6 (H. Holt & Co. 1933). 
 23 See id. (citing JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, LIFE IN A NEW ENGLAND TOWN: 1787, 
1788—DIARY OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 113 n.1 (Little, Brown, and Co. 1903)). 
 24 ABBÉ CLAUDE FRANÇOIS XAVIER MILLOT, ELEMENTS OF ANCIENT HISTORY 
(New York, Mott & Lyon 1797). 
 25 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, LIFE IN A NEW ENGLAND TOWN: 1787, 1788—DIARY OF 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 113 n.1 (Little, Brown, and Co. 1903). 
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Stone’s claim in regard to a book burning at Harvard, circa 
1789, did you believe it?  Try to remember your reaction, if any.  
Did it seem shockingly wrong, or did you just read past his 
claim as a matter of no real consequence, or did it seem 
reasonably tenable to you?  And if you thought the latter, what 
other historical fictions (or unsupported factual claims) might 
you believe in error (or absent sufficient evidence), and what 
does that say about the prejudices you may harbor in relation 
to people different from yourself? 
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